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THE ILLIBERALIZATION OF AMERICAN
ELECTION LAW: A STUDY IN DEMOCRATIC
DECONSOLIDATION
James A. Gardner*
For many years, the dominant view among American election law scholars
has been that the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence of
democratic practice got off to a promising start during the mid-twentieth
century but has since then slowly deteriorated into incoherence. In light of
the United States’ recent turn toward populist authoritarianism, that view
needs to be substantially revised. With the benefit of hindsight, it now
appears that the Supreme Court has functioned, in its management of the
constitutional jurisprudence of democracy, as a vector of infection—a kind
of super-spreader of populist authoritarianism.
There is, sadly, nothing unusual these days about an apex court
reinterpreting a formerly liberal constitutional jurisprudence to support a
populist authoritarian regime. Typically, however, constitutional courts
pivot toward authoritarianism suddenly, after they have been captured
through aggressive court-packing or coercive threats and intimidation. In
the United States, however, federal courts retain real independence, and the
process of illiberalization has been correspondingly slower and less
immediate. In particular, the Supreme Court has slowly illiberalized
American election law in a two-stage process: first, by deconsolidating a
liberal jurisprudence into incoherence and then by reconsolidating it into a
form more conducive to authoritarianism. The main strategy by which this
has occurred has been an increasingly aggressive deployment of an
ever-narrower palette of individual rights, gradually narrowing a complex
and conceptually rich jurisprudence to a single dimension—a judicial
strategy that, in its radical anti-pluralism, is deeply populist, fundamentally
illiberal, and profoundly destructive of the inherited liberal democratic
settlement of the late twentieth century.

* Bridget and Thomas Black SUNY Distinguished Professor of Law and Research Professor

of Political Science, University at Buffalo School of Law, The State University of New York.
This Article was prepared for the Symposium entitled Toward Our 60th Presidential Election,
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INTRODUCTION
Sometimes we don’t fully understand where we’re headed until we arrive.
In those moments, gazing back along the route we’ve traveled, things can
look very different from how they appeared during the journey.
For many years, the dominant view among American election law scholars
has been that the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence of
democratic practice got off to a promising start during the mid-twentieth
century but has, over the last several decades, slowly deteriorated into
incoherence. There it has remained, festering, unable to perform
competently the minimal tasks that a democratic people demands from its
own basic constitutional framework. Most scholars even agree on the cause:
a disastrous methodological choice by the Supreme Court to look to
individual rights rather than constitutional structure as the principal—indeed,
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the virtually exclusive—source of constitutional guidance on questions of
democratic practice.1
That view, I will argue here, was not wrong when it emerged, but in light
of recent events it must be substantially revised, for it was the view of the
traveler, a snapshot taken en route, when we still did not know where we
were headed. Now we know. For nearly a quarter of a millennium, what
Americans thought they knew about themselves is that the United States was
a liberal republic founded on the principle of popular self-rule2 and that its
history has unfolded, if not in one long, steady march toward a perfected
democracy, at least along a serpentine path leading in that general direction,3
guided by a broad societal consensus that a perfected democracy was our
final destination as a people. In 2016, Americans tore themselves from that
dream by electing to the presidency, for the first time, a populist
authoritarian4 who, with the full support of one of the two major national
parties,5 waged a four-year war not only on democracy but also on the
philosophical liberalism on which it rests.
From this vantage point, things look very different, and my goal here is to
retell the story of American election law in a way informed by an
understanding only recently made possible by the unwelcome realization,
afforded with the benefit of hindsight, that right-wing populist
authoritarianism may long have been our at least partially unwitting
destination. In this story, the Supreme Court has not been a naive or heedless
producer of doctrinal incoherence. On the contrary, it is now clear that the
Supreme Court has functioned, in its management of the constitutional
jurisprudence of democracy, as a vector of infection, a kind of super-spreader
of the conditions in which populist authoritarianism may take root and thrive.
What makes this story unusual is not, however, that an apex court has
moved to replace a formerly liberal constitutional jurisprudence with one
more congenial to populist authoritarianism. Sadly, democratic backsliding
has become so commonplace around the world in the last decade that this is
exactly what has occurred in many regimes.6 Typically, however,
constitutional courts pivot toward authoritarianism only after they have been
captured by a newly installed authoritarian regime—most often following
aggressive deployment of policies to replace incumbent judges, pack the
court with new appointees, or coerce favorable rulings through threats and

1. See infra Part III.B.2.
2. See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA:
AN
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955).
3. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES xvii–xviii, xx (2000).
4. See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 2 (2018); PIPPA
NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURAL BACKLASH: TRUMP, BREXIT, AND AUTHORITARIAN
POPULISM 245–46 (2019).
5. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 4, at 69, 70, 201.
6. See generally David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive Judicial Review: Courts
Against Democracy, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1313 (2020).
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intimidation.7 The hallmark of this kind of jurisprudential pivot is the
suddenness with which it occurs.
Conditions in the United States, however, are different. Even today,
federal courts retain real independence, reinforced by powerful norms of
judicial branch autonomy, the ready availability of a robust veto tool, and a
long history of willingness to use it in self-defense.8 As a result, the
illiberalization of American election law has not occurred according to the
emerging template. It has instead occurred much more slowly and has been
driven largely by the Supreme Court itself rather than by a powerful,
authoritarian chief executive demanding judicial fealty. As a result, the
jurisprudence has evolved incrementally in roughly two major stages. In the
first stage, the Court took a robust liberal jurisprudence of democracy and
deconsolidated it, rendering it, as so many scholars have observed,
incoherent. In hindsight, however, we can now see that incoherence was not
a destination but merely a temporary waypoint, for it was followed closely
by a second stage of jurisprudential development in which the Court began
to reconsolidate the constitutional jurisprudence of democracy along illiberal
lines.9
The Court’s main strategy throughout this process has been simple and
consistent: it has pressed, with increasing aggressiveness, an ever-narrower
palette of constitutional rules, to the point where a constitution initially
well-stocked with provisions and principles relating to democratic practice
was gradually remade by the Court into one that is textually bare and
conceptually impoverished. Today, the Court has reached the point where it
typically views only one provision in the entire Constitution—the First
Amendment, seven words out of thousands—as relevant to the resolution of
constitutional issues of democratic self-governance.
Political theorists agree that the defining characteristic of modern
populism is its deep aversion to political pluralism,10 and in this sense, the
Court’s strategy has been straight out of the populist playbook. By gradually
stripping the Constitution’s rich, multidimensional conception of democracy
7. See id. at 1338–45. See generally David Kosař & Katarína Šipulová, How to Fight
Court-Packing?, 6 CONST. STUD. 133 (2020).
8. This is seen, for example, in the decisive rejections by federal courts of Trump
campaign challenges to results of the 2020 presidential election. See Rosalind S. Helderman
& Elise Viebeck, “The Last Wall”: How Dozens of Judges Across the Political Spectrum
Rejected Trump’s Efforts to Overturn the Election, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2020, 2:12 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/judges-trump-electionlawsuits/2020/12/12/e3a57224-3a72-11eb-98c4-25dc9f4987e8_story.html
[https://perma.cc/PQ5H-AA5E].
9. In proposing a two-stage process, my analysis has much in common with that of
Landau’s Populist Constitutions, except Landau deals with the more common situation in
which a liberal constitution is deconsolidated and then reconsolidated primarily by textual
amendment and replacement. See David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 85 UNIV. CHI. L. REV.
521 (2018). Here, the process I describe involves almost exclusively an apex court’s
superintendence of a constitutional document, the text of which remains stable.
10. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 25 (2016); NADIA URBINATI, ME THE
PEOPLE: HOW POPULISM TRANSFORMS DEMOCRACY 91 (2019). See generally WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, ANTI-PLURALISM: THE POPULIST THREAT TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018).
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down to a single concept—freedom of speech—the Court has shaped a
jurisprudence that is much more than merely incoherent. It has become
populist, pro-authoritarian, and hostile to liberal democracy; it has become a
kind of anti-election jurisprudence that is fundamentally illiberal and deeply
destructive of the inherited liberal settlement of the late twentieth century.
The problem, in other words, is not the Court’s incoherence; it is the Court’s
illiberalism.
This Article will make good on these claims in the following way. Part I
provides a brief introduction to the problem that has long concerned scholars
of election law: the slow descent of the constitutional jurisprudence of
democracy into incoherence. Part II offers a quick review of global trends
and patterns of democratic backsliding in liberal democracies, focusing on
the role of courts. Part III carefully traces the arc of the Supreme Court’s
election jurisprudence, showing its evolution from liberalism to a
deconsolidated incoherence to what is, at present, a slowly consolidating
illiberalism.
I. THE VIEW FROM THERE: THE JURISPRUDENTIAL DRIFT INTO
INCOHERENCE
After 170 years of near dormancy, the issue of constitutional management
of democracy burst into the public consciousness in the 1960s following a
series of Supreme Court decisions that profoundly altered the way Americans
practice democratic self-governance. In the space of a single decade, the
Court invoked the U.S. Constitution to invalidate long-standing practices of
racial gerrymandering11 and malapportionment of election districts at the
federal,12 state,13 and local levels.14 It decimated time-honored voter
eligibility requirements based on residency,15 duration of residency,16
payment of poll taxes,17 and property ownership.18 It struck down obstacles
to electoral candidacy, invalidating state-imposed ballot access requirements
relating to signatures,19 filing fees,20 and possession of property.21 It tore
through restrictions on the way campaigns are conducted, upending bans on
election day campaigning22 and restrictions on criticism of incumbent public
11. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960).
12. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1964).
13. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964).
14. Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 497 (1968). The Court also went on to
invalidate malapportionment in many kinds of special districts. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior
Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 58–59 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705–06
(1969).
15. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96–97 (1965).
16. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972).
17. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
18. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622, 633 (1969).
19. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 60–61 (1968).
20. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718–19 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149
(1972).
21. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 364 (1970).
22. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966).
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officials.23 And it decisively upheld the single most significant congressional
intervention in the history of American civil rights,24 the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (VRA), which itself set aside well-established principles of
federalism by subordinating state electoral practices to direct federal
oversight.25
During this run, the Court began to build and deploy a rich and deeply
liberal constitutional jurisprudence of democratic practice that dismantled
long-standing barriers to participation by the politically marginalized,
including Black people, city residents, the poor, and political dissenters.26 In
so doing, it smashed and discarded old practices, holding out to the American
public the possibility of new regulatory regimes that promised not just
electoral fairness, but the systematic, mindful pursuit of democratic goals in
place of reflexive obedience to inherited practice and passive acquiescence
in long-standing power structures.
Then things got weird.
After a decade of breaking down barriers to participation by the politically
weak, the Court began to apply the same aggressive skepticism to regulatory
measures meant to prevent domination of the political process by the
powerful. In Buckley v. Valeo,27 a controversial 1976 ruling,28 the Court
started down this path by holding not only that the Constitution does not
implicitly contain, or even look favorably upon, any principle of equality of
political influence among citizens, but that it is in fact actively opposed to
such a principle, even as an ideal.29 The Court used this holding as the
launching pad for a forty-year march through measures attempting to control
political spending, during which it invalidated regulatory caps on total
campaign spending by candidates;30 contributions by rich candidates to their
own campaigns;31 and independent campaign expenditures by private
individuals,32 political parties,33 political committees,34 advocacy
organizations,35 and, in its 2010 ruling in Citizens United v. FEC,36 for-profit
corporations.37
23. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).
24. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966).
25. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52
U.S.C.).
26. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
27. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
28. For an overview of critiques of Buckley, see JAMES A. GARDNER & GUY-URIEL
CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 759–66 (2d ed. 2018).
29. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.
30. Id. at 54–59.
31. Id. at 51–54.
32. Id. at 39–51.
33. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado Republican I), 518 U.S.
604, 624–26 (1996).
34. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500–01 (1985).
35. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–65 (1986).
36. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
37. Id. at 365.
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The Court also began to decide cases in ways that produced bizarre and
inexplicable outcomes. It held, for example, that the Constitution prohibits
limitations on political spending but permits restrictions on political
contributions,38 thereby creating a system of campaign finance in which the
demand for political money is unlimited and insatiable, but the supply of it
is highly constrained—a recipe for cheating and corruption.39 In the field of
political parties, the Court held that the Constitution prohibits the partisan
blanket primary,40 a measure adopted by several states for the seemingly
uncontroversial purpose of producing more moderate candidates in an era of
increasing partisan polarization. In the area of judicial elections, it ruled that
the Constitution prohibits regulatory restrictions on the grounds upon, and
the methods by which, judicial candidates may campaign for elective
judgeships,41 obliterating a long-standing distinction between the nature of
campaigns for judicial and legislative offices. This change all but forced
previously civil campaigns for elective judgeships into the pattern of bitter
partisanship and high spending normally associated with legislative
campaigns.42
Despite having affirmed the constitutionality of public financing of
elections,43 the Court nevertheless invalidated measures providing
supplemental public funding to poor candidates who face rich, self-financed
ones on the ground that such measures “penalize” the rich by unfairly
eliminating their resource advantage.44 In Shelby County v. Holder,45 the
Court gutted on constitutional grounds the preclearance provisions of the
VRA,46 the centerpiece of the most successful civil rights statute in American
history. In McCutcheon v. FEC47 and McDonnell v. United States,48 the
Court held that the Constitution embodies a definition of political corruption
so narrow as to preclude regulation of virtually any political transaction
except the most blatant exchanges of cash for power.49 At the same time, the
Court failed in four tries to develop and apply a constitutional standard to
restrain one of the most pressing political problems of our time, the

38. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–23 (1976) (per curiam).
39. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1710–11 (1999).
40. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 585–86 (2000).
41. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
42. See
Money
in
Judicial
Elections,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/strengthen-our-courts/promote-fair-courts/moneyjudicial-elections [https://perma.cc/N4ZG-TPR4] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
43. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85–108.
44. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 742, 754–55
(2011); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740 (2008).
45. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
46. Id. at 556–57.
47. 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
48. 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
49. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372–73, 2375; McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 207–10, 227.
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increasingly aggressive practice of partisan gerrymandering,50 and in Rucho
v. Common Cause,51 abandoned the effort altogether.52 And perhaps most
significantly of all, the Court in Bush v. Gore53 ordered a halt to ballot
recounts in the 2000 presidential election, an action that was widely, if in
retrospect not entirely accurately,54 believed at the time to have thrown the
presidential race to the Republican candidate, George W. Bush.
What to make of all this? It is, of course, the stock-in-trade of scholars to
criticize, yet scholarly critique of the Court’s election law jurisprudence has
gone well beyond professionally routine criticism of particular decisions or
doctrines. In fact, there is scarcely an election law scholar working today
who has not at some point declared the Court’s entire body of election law
decisions to be literally “incoherent,”55 or even, for lack of a more potent
adjective, “beyond incoheren[t],”56 to say nothing of “muddled,”57 a
“doctrinal quagmire,”58 and “utterly at sea.”59
50. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
51. 139 S. Ct. 2514 (2019).
52. Id.
53. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
54. Subsequent investigations suggest that completing the interrupted recount would not
likely have changed the result. See Ford Fessenden & John M. Broder, Examining the Vote:
The Overview; Study of Disputed Florida Ballots Finds Justices Did Not Cast the Deciding
Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/12/us/examining-voteoverview-study-disputed-florida-ballots-finds-justices-did-not.html [https://perma.cc/PP6A29SC].
55. See, e.g., Albert W. Altschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After McCutcheon,
Citizens United, and Speechnow, 67 FLA. L. REV. 389, 445 n.281 (2015); Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and
Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 349 (2007); Edward B. Foley, Election Law and the
Roberts Court: An Introduction, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 735–36, 742 (2007); Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer & Laura Jane Durfee, Leaving the Thicket at Last?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV.
419, 421, 431–32; James A. Gardner, The Dignity of Voters–A Dissent, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV.
435, 440–41 (2010); Heather K. Gerken, The Right to Vote: Is the Amendment Game Worth
the Candle?, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 11, 24 (2014); Joel Gora, The First
Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST. L. REV. 935, 980 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is
Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 32–33 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, New
Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 761 (2007); Daniel
R. Ortiz, The Informational Interest, 27 J.L. & POL. 663, 682 (2012); Lori Ringhand, Defining
Democracy: The Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Dilemma, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 77, 80
(2004); Daniel P. Tokaji, Desegregation, Discrimination and Democracy: Parents Involved’s
Disregard for Process, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 847, 848 (2008). As long as a decade ago, Professor
Tokaji described “[t]he incoherence of the Supreme Court’s election law jurisprudence” as “a
recurring theme” of an entire symposium. Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts: On
Judicial Intervention in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065, 1065 (2007).
56. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s
Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064 (2008).
57. Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law: Partisan Gerrymandering and a
Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1097 (2007).
58. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review
of Political Gerrymanders, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 574 (2004).
59. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601, 604
(2007).
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This conclusion was, at the time, difficult to resist, and logically raised the
question of what might account for the Court’s slow and alarming drift into
incoherence in a domain of constitutional law that, perhaps more than any
other, ought to enjoy clarity and stability. For two decades, the prevailing
scholarly consensus was, and remains, that the roots of the Court’s difficulty
lie in a methodological choice. The U.S. Constitution contains many
provisions that establish and regulate processes of democratic self-rule.
Some of these, like Article I, Section 2, which provides that the House of
Representatives shall be “chosen every second Year by the People of the
several States,” and sets minimum qualifications for representatives, are
structural.60 Others, like the Equal Protection Clause and the First
Amendment, establish judicially enforceable individual rights.61 The
problem, scholars have generally contended, is that the constitutional
jurisprudence of democracy developed by the Court increasingly is founded
almost exclusively on individual rights and pays virtually no attention to
foundational principles of representative democracy embedded in the
Constitution’s structural provisions—a position that frames the so-called
“rights-structure debate.”62
But that was then. Since this body of scholarly opinion emerged, much
has become clear that was not clear at the time.
II. DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING
Following the conclusion of World War II, and again after the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989, two successive waves of worldwide democratization so
dramatically expanded the number of democracies in the world63 that it
seemed to some as though liberal democracy64 were the culmination of some

60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
61. Id. amends. I, XIV.
62. Among the many works that have either made or expressed sympathy for the structural
critique of the Court’s rights-oriented election law jurisprudence are: Charles, supra note 59,
at 649–70; Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures
for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 644 (2008);
Gardner, supra note 55, at 441–42; Heather Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court,
Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 504 (2004); Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The
Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1345 (2001); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings,
Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 727 (1998); Richard H.
Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29,
40 (2004); Ringhand, supra note 55, at 87; Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of the Devices
of Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1326, 1329–30 (1994).
63. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 17 (1991); JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT: THE
REVOLT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE WORLDWIDE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 35, 49–64 (2013); LARRY DIAMOND, ILL WINDS: SAVING DEMOCRACY FROM
RUSSIAN RAGE, CHINESE AMBITION, AND AMERICAN COMPLACENCY 43–53 (2019).
64. See infra Part III for discussion of the term “liberalism” and its relation to
“democracy.”
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kind of “natural human evolution.”65 More recently, however, this trend has
undergone an equally dramatic reversal. The number of states becoming less
democratic has climbed steadily over the last two decades to levels not seen
since the late 1970s; almost 35 percent of the world’s population now lives
in “autocratizing nations.”66 Moreover, even in many states that remain
fundamentally democratic, the quality of democracy, as measured by the free
enjoyment of civil liberties, the rule of law, and the integrity of democratic
processes, has declined.67 In this process of “democratic backsliding,”
long-standing, stable democracies have suffered slow, incremental
degradation of previously reliable democratic institutions.68 According to
Freedom House, for example, the number of “highly deficient democracies”
around the world doubled between 2006 and 2010.69 In 2016, The
Economist’s Democracy Index downgraded the United States to a “flawed
democracy.”70
The typical pattern by which democratic decline occurs also has changed
dramatically from earlier periods.
During the twentieth century,
authoritarian takeovers typically occurred by way of a military coup or naked
electoral fraud on a massive scale.71 Today, in contrast, democratic
backsliding most often follows an open democratic process in which an
illiberal party wins power under reasonably fair rules of democratic
competition before gradually entrenching itself in power through
anti-democratic means.72
This kind of incremental democratic backsliding has by now become
sufficiently commonplace to allow comparativists to identify certain
common patterns by which democratically elected authoritarian leaders
gradually consolidate power and undermine liberal democratic institutions—
a kind of “authoritarian’s playbook.”73 The most typical strategy involves

65. ROBERT KAGAN, THE JUNGLE GROWS BACK: AMERICA AND OUR IMPERILED WORLD
61, 134 (2018); see also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN
(1st ed. 1992); HELENA ROSENBLATT, THE LOST HISTORY OF LIBERALISM: FROM ANCIENT
ROME TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 168 (2018).
66. Seraphine F. Maerz et al., State of the World 2019: Autocratization Surges—
Resistance Grows, 27 DEMOCRATIZATION 909, 909 (2020).
67. See GALSTON, supra note 10, at 12; Pippa Norris & Max Grömping, Populist Threats
to Electoral Integrity: The Year in Elections, 2016–2017, at 28 (Harvard Kennedy Sch.
Faculty Rsch., Working Paper No. RWP17-018, 2017).
68. Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 5 (2016); TOM
GINSBURG AND AZIZ HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 43–47 (2018);
DIAMOND, supra note 63, at 55.
69. KURLANTZICK, supra note 63, at 9.
70. THE
ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE
UNIT,
DEMOCRACY
INDEX
2016:
OF
THE
REVENGE
“DEPLORABLES”
(2016),
http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/
WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index2016.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2016 [https://perma.cc/4HQL-K6A3].
71. See Bermeo, supra note 68, at 6–7.
72. See id. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE
AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR (2010).
73. James A. Gardner, Illiberalism and Authoritarianism in the American States, 70 AM.
U. L. REV. 829, 853 (2021).
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moving quickly to concentrate power in the executive,74 which in turn entails
the systematic undermining of interbranch checks on executive power.75
Where the structure of governance includes a constitutional court with the
power of judicial review, this tactic requires undermining the independence
of the court to the point that it becomes incapable of curbing abuses of
government power.76
In most cases of democratic backsliding, the tactics deployed to undermine
judicial independence have been direct, aggressive, and initiated by an
authoritarian executive, usually with the cooperation of a legislature
controlled by the leader’s party. These tactics include court-packing through
manipulation of the size of the apex court; seizing control of the
appointments process; or the use of credible, coercive threats against sitting
judges.77 The hallmark of this kind of judicial capture—and, of course, its
desired outcome—is a sudden alteration in the court’s jurisprudence in favor
of results preferred by the regime. As Professors David Landau and Rosalind
Dixon explain, a captured apex court that had previously stood up to an
authoritarian regime may suddenly adopt a posture of passivity and begin to
uphold legislation or executive actions that undermine core principles of
democratic self-governance, insulating the ruling regime from meaningful
electoral competition.78 In more extreme cases, a captured court may begin
on its own actively to devise and aggressively to apply new legal doctrine
that advances the authoritarian regime’s agenda.79
The characteristic evidence that such measures have successfully captured
constitutional courts is a sudden shift in jurisprudence and legal reasoning—
the court’s methods and decisions are liberal until, suddenly and
suspiciously, they are not. Thus, in Bolivia, for example, in a 2015 decision,
the Bolivian high court considered a constitutional provision limiting
presidential terms to be a clear and valid restriction on the ability of President
Evo Morales to continue in office.80 Following an aggressive program of
court-packing, the court two years later reversed itself and, in an opinion
riddled with dubious reasoning, invalidated the constitution’s presidential
term limits as a violation of international human rights law.81
In the United States, democratic backsliding in the executive and
legislative branches of the national government has occurred more or less
74. See Bermeo, supra note 68, at 10–13 (discussing “executive aggrandizement”);
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 68, at 150–54, 178–79.
75. See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 68, at 72–73.
76. See DIAMOND, supra note 63, at 64–65; András Jakab, What Can Constitutional Law
Do Against the Erosion of Democracy and the Rule of Law? 7–8 (Max Planck Inst. of Compar
Pub. L. & Int’l L. Research Paper, Paper No. 2019-15, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3454649 [https://perma.cc/S9C7-9DAK].
77. See Kosař & Šipulová, supra note 7, at 139–44; Landau & Dixon, supra note 6, at
1336.
78. See Landau & Dixon, supra note 6, at 1346–49.
79. See id. at 1349–53.
80. Tribunal Constitucional de Bolivia [Constitutional Tribunal of Bolivia] Oct. 14, 2015,
Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional 0382/2015-CA Expediente 12664-2015-26-CPR.
81. See Landau & Dixon, supra note 6, at 1362–63.
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according to the usual pattern. Donald Trump, a populist authoritarian
candidate,82 won the presidency in a fair and open contest, and the
Republican Party, which in the wake of Trump’s victory now leans decisively
toward right-wing populism,83 held and retained the Senate. Following the
authoritarian playbook, Trump, with the approval and support of Republicans
in Congress,84 mounted a series of attacks on the foundations of the liberal
democratic state by demonizing political opponents; attacking independent
institutions like the press, the judiciary, and the federal civil service; praising
and encouraging white supremacists; and lying constantly. Trump ultimately
attempted openly to undermine electoral democracy itself by denying his
2020 electoral defeat, and then inciting a riot at the Capitol in the hope of
disrupting the constitutionally prescribed process for concluding the
presidential election.85
On the judicial side, however, the story is more complicated. To be sure,
Republicans have long engaged in a highly deliberate campaign to control
the judiciary including, on the state level, through overt court-packing.86
Nevertheless, the federal judiciary is institutionally well-insulated from
political pressure, and enjoys a tradition of significant judicial independence
stretching all the way back to the founding era.87 Although conditions thus
exist that would allow the U.S. Supreme Court to maintain itself as a bulwark
against populist and authoritarian efforts to erode liberal democracy, it
simply has not done so.
However, again because of the Court’s independence, the illiberalization
of American election law has proceeded along a path different from the one
described above, a path that has been largely under the control of the Court
and which it has followed in its own way, in its own time. The process of
illiberalization has thus been incremental, complex, and largely hidden from
public view because it has occurred mainly through incremental changes in

82. See NORRIS & INGLEHART, supra note 4, at 245–46.
83. See Robert C. Lieberman et al., The Trump Presidency and American Democracy: A
Historical and Comparative Analysis, 17 PERSPS. ON POL. 470, 471 (2018); Paul Pierson &
Eric Schickler, Madison’s Constitution Under Stress: A Developmental Analysis of Political
Polarization, 23 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 37, 53 (2020).
84. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 4, at 69–70, 201; Gardner, supra note 73, at 863–
67; Lieberman et al., supra note 83, at 473.
85. On President Trump’s disdain for constitutional norms, see Neil S. Siegel, Political
Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177 (2018);
Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018); Jamal
Greene, Trump as a Constitutional Failure, 93 IND. L.J. 93 (2018); see also Lieberman et al.,
supra note 83, at 471. On his refusal to accept the election results and incitement of
insurrection, see H.R. Res. 24, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021) (article of impeachment against
President Trump).
86. See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, PARTISAN SUPREMACY: HOW THE GOP ENLISTED
COURTS TO RIG AMERICA’S ELECTION RULES (2020); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 10 (2008); Marin
K. Levy, Packing and Unpacking State Courts, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1135–45
(2020).
87. Marbury v. Madison is, of course, the conventional locus classicus. See 5 U.S. 137
(1803).
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constitutional doctrine, sometimes of a highly technical nature.88 This
illiberalization has proceeded in two stages: First, the Court deconsolidated
an existing liberal constitutional jurisprudence of democracy into
incoherence, creating the kind of chaos and confusion in which
authoritarianism is known to thrive.89 Then, the Court began a slow process
of reconsolidating the jurisprudence as illiberal and anti-democratic.
III. THE ARC OF ILLIBERALIZATION
This part traces in detail the development over fifty years of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence of democratic practice to show its evolution from
liberal to illiberal. Before proceeding to this analysis, it is important to
explain briefly what I mean by these terms.
The meaning of “liberalism” has often been deeply contested, even by its
own adherents.90 Nevertheless, contemporary writers generally agree on
several core features of liberal thought. Perhaps its most basic principle is
popular sovereignty—the doctrine that the people of a society are entitled to
rule themselves, rather than to be ruled by some leader whose claim to rule
derives from either tradition or divine command.91 The idea of popular
sovereignty is conventionally associated with other commitments upon
which popular sovereignty rests, or which are essential to its success. These
include, for example, a commitment to the fundamental political equality of
citizens;92 the requirement of a “lively civil society,”93 in which citizens
enjoy the freedom necessary to develop their own ideas about the nature of
the good life and how the polity ought best to pursue it; the “rule of law”;94
and, typically, a package of basic human rights, such as the rights of free
speech and free association, thought necessary to the effectuation of popular
self-rule.95
Illiberalism equally covers a great diversity of ground, but for present
purposes, I will consider it simply as any body of political thought opposed
to any of the foundational commitments of liberalism just described. Thus,
for example, a system would count as illiberal if it is premised on the
inequality of citizens; if it denies the entitlement of the entire populace to rule
itself through majority rule; if civil society is understood to be in fact not free

88. In this, it differs considerably from the burst of new electoral regulation law generated
over the last few years by Republican-controlled state legislatures, which has been direct and
overt in its anti-democratic aims. For an overview, see Gardner, supra note 73, at 897–908,
and sources cited therein.
89. See KAGAN, supra note 65, at 10.
90. See generally ROSENBLATT, supra note 65.
91. See generally ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA: OR THE NATURAL POWER OF KINGS
(1680) (the work that prompted John Locke to develop foundational conceptions of liberalism
in his two treatises). See also ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY
OF THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 242 (1964).
92. See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 68, at 24.
93. See DIAMOND, supra note 63, at 19.
94. See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 68, at 9 (emphasis omitted).
95. See id.; JUAN J. LINZ, TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 20, 58 (2000).
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but structured irrevocably by higher laws of religious or traditional origin;
and so forth.
At this historical moment, however, the particular strain of illiberalism of
greatest concern is “authoritarian populism.”96 Populists generally hold that
a “true” people, inevitably narrower in scope than the entire population of the
state, has lost its rightful control of the state to a corrupt minority.97 The
solution requires a strong leader with a profound understanding of the true
people’s needs,98 who will accomplish their objectives through the
accumulation and deployment of immense power that ought not to be
restrained by institutional or even democratic checks.99 Of particular
concern here is that “populism is always anti-pluralist”;100 it denies the
plurality of society’s members and their interests and beliefs, and thus offers
“a phenomenology that involves replacing the whole with one of its parts.”101
As a result, “because the people and the leader have effectively merged . . .
the role of deliberation and mediation can be drastically reduced.”102
While we normally associate populism with the representative branches of
government—the legislature, and above all, the executive—populist
behavior can also be found in the judicial branch. As Professors Anya
Bernstein and Glen Staszewski have persuasively demonstrated, populist
judging has a distinctive style that, mirroring populist political beliefs,
prefers simplicity over complexity; understands and employs “correct” forms
of judging, uncorrupted by the influence of untrustworthy elites; and rejects
any kind of interpretational or methodological pluralism.103 Commitments
to textualism and originalism, they argue, exemplify the populist style of
judging and, in their rejection of practical reasoning, are inherently illiberal
and anti-democratic.
A. Beginnings: Liberal and Plural
1. The Raw Material of the Constitutional Scheme
The first and foremost function of a constitution is to create the state104 by
establishing institutions, assigning powers,105 and in general “defin[ing] the
96. NORRIS & INGLEHART, supra note 4, at 9–12.
97. See MÜLLER, supra note 10, at 22–23; URBINATI, supra note 10, at 77–112.
98. See MÜLLER, supra note 10, at 32–38; URBINATI, supra note 10, at 113–57.
99. See DIAMOND, supra note 63, at 62–63; Lieberman et al., supra note 83.
100. GALSTON, supra note 10, at 127; see MÜLLER, supra note 10, at 3.
101. URBINATI, supra note 10, at 13.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Anya Bernstein & Glen Staszewski, Judicial Populism, 106 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021).
104. See EDWARD SCHNEIER, CRAFTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES: THE POLITICS OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 2 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View, in
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 267, 273–74 (Thomas Christiano & John
Christman eds., 2009); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE
L.J. 408, 412–15 (2007).
105. See Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and
Political Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
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structure of the ‘normally’ functioning state.”106 Thus, even before they
impose limits on official power, constitutions must “establish institutions that
allow people to cooperate and coordinate to pursue projects that they cannot
achieve on their own.”107 Consistent with this understanding, every
constitution the world over devotes considerable attention to the basic
structure and operation of the state, including the form of government, and
where that form of government is democratic, to the basic practices of
democratic self-governance. As Professor Samuel Issacharoff has observed,
modern constitutions “[a]lmost invariably . . . give express textual protection
to democratic processes and to the institutions of democratic politics.”108
The U.S. Constitution is no different. At least a dozen provisions of the
original document deal explicitly with the structure of democratic
representation (a full inventory of constitutional provisions regulating
democratic practice is provided in the Appendix). Article I, Section 2, for
example, establishes the system of democratic representation by which the
House of Representatives is to be constituted,109 sets the qualifications for
representatives, and specifies how representation in the House is to be
allocated among the states.110 Article I, Section 4 authorizes states to
regulate the time, place, and manner of elections for federal office, subject to
a congressional override.111 Another provision prohibits the granting of titles
of nobility.112 Several provisions establish mechanisms for selecting the
president.113 Another provides that the United States “shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”114
Constitutional amendments have more than doubled the number of
provisions addressing democratic practice. These provisions revise the
mechanisms for selecting presidents and for apportioning representation in
the House, and extend democratic methods of selection to the U.S. Senate.115
They create political rights of free speech, association, and equality;116
drastically limit the grounds upon which citizens may be disfranchised;117
and grant Congress new powers to police and enforce constitutionalized

CONSTITUTIONS 3, 6 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013); Keith E. Whittington,
The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 2013 ILL. L. REV.
1847, 1855; Young, supra note 104, at 412.
106. Peter C. Ordeshook, Some Rules of Constitutional Design, in LIBERALISM AND THE
ECONOMIC ORDER 198, 205 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1993).
107. JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL THEORY 34 (2016).
108. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA OF
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 275 (2015).
109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
110. Id. cls. 2, 3.
111. Id. § 4, cl. 1.
112. Id. § 9.
113. Id. art. II, § 1, cls. 1–4.
114. Id. art. IV, § 4.
115. Id. amend. XII; id. amend XIV, § 2; id. amend XVII.
116. Id. amend. I; id. amend XIV, § 1.
117. Id. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
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constraints on democratic practice.118 Nearly thirty provisions, totaling
roughly 1855 words—about one-quarter of the document119—are devoted to
establishing and regulating the practice of representative democracy in the
United States.
This body of textual resources, moreover, is supplemented by a rich record
of political thought by some of the most original and penetrating political
thinkers that the United States has ever produced—a body of thought that
many members of the Supreme Court consider themselves obliged to consult
in constitutional cases.120 Standard reference documents, such as The
Federalist Papers, Madison’s notes of the 1787 convention, Farrand’s notes
of the state ratifying conventions, and the public speeches and private
correspondence of the Framers and other prominent individuals of the
founding period—to say nothing of the records associated with enactment of
the Reconstruction Amendments and later amendments concerning voting—
run to many thousands of pages.121 In sum, there is no shortage of resources
available to assist courts in giving meaning to America’s commitments to
popular sovereignty and democratic self-governance.
2. The Founding Jurisprudence: Pluralist and Liberal
The Court initially inserted itself into the field of democratic elections in
dramatic fashion. In a pair of cases decided in 1964, Wesberry v. Sanders122
and Reynolds v. Sims,123 it held that the method used by the states to draw
congressional and state legislative districts was constitutionally defective,
thus invalidating at a stroke, as Justice Harlan complained in dissent, “the
composition of the House of Representatives”124 as well as that of “all but a
few” state legislatures.125 That is, the Court’s rulings held unconstitutional
the very makeup of legislative power throughout the length and breadth of
the United States.
118. Id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend XV, § 2; id. amend XIX, § 2; id. amend XXIV, § 2;
id. amend XXVI, § 2.
119. This is assuming the Constitution has a total word count of about 7500 words. See
Neil M. Gorsuch, Why Originalism Is the Best Approach to the Constitution, TIME (Sept. 6,
2019, 8:00 AM), https://time.com/5670400/justice-neil-gorsuch-why-originalism-is-the-bestapproach-to-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/SX7T-TQZD].
120. Justice Scalia, according to his biographer, thought himself the “King of the
Originalists.” BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 415–29 (2008). Other
justices have of course announced strong commitments to originalism. See, e.g., Gorsuch,
supra note 119.
121. To give but two examples, the papers of Thomas Jefferson, collected at the University
of Virginia, run to forty-three volumes, and those of James Madison run to forty-two volumes
so far, with more projected. See James P. McClure & J. Jefferson Looney, The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson, UNIV. OF VA. PRESS, https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/
default.xqy?keys=TSJN-print-01&mode=TOC [https://perma.cc/CB6N-NXU5] (last visited
Sept. 17, 2021); Papers of James Madison, UNIV. OF VA. ARTS & SCIENCES,
https://pjm.as.virginia.edu/editions [https://perma.cc/SJN5-J994] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
122. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
123. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
124. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 20 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
125. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The Court’s methods and reasoning were, in both cases, eclectic, drawing
on a great variety of the available interpretive resources and traditions of
constitutional interpretation. The majority in Wesberry rested its holding
primarily on the language of Article I, Section 2—a structural provision—
which requires that congressional representatives be chosen “by the People
of the several States.”126 But the Court drew meaning from this spare
provision by resorting to other sources of constitutional meaning.127 It
examined the deliberations and intentions of the Framers of the Constitution,
devoting considerable attention to their understanding of the “rotten
boroughs” of England and the historical circumstances of the Great
Compromise.128 It drew on principles of equality, normally associated with
the individual rights provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.129 It looked
for guidance to other structural provisions such as Article I, Section 3 and
Article V.130 Most importantly, the Court began to draw from the
Constitution, though only insofar as necessary to decision in the case before
it, a theory of representative democracy itself—a theory in which, consistent
with the fundamental tenets of liberalism,131 all citizens are deemed equal in
their entitlement to participate in whatever processes of governance the
people collectively decide to adopt.
The Court deployed the same approach even more forcefully a few months
later in Reynolds. There, it relied on many of its own precedents, which it
read, collectively, to establish implicitly a constitutionally grounded right to
vote.132 It invoked constitutional text in the form of the Equal Protection
Clause.133 It read Wesberry as identifying a constitutionally embedded
“fundamental principle of representative government,” which it described as
“equal representation for equal numbers of people.”134 It brought in
principles of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to help it locate
the right to vote among “the basic civil rights of man.”135 It further
elaborated its emerging theory of democratic representation by declaring
unequivocally that “[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres.
Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic
interests”136—a position that reads the Constitution as decisively opposed,
down to its deepest conceptual roots, to malapportionment. In addition, the
Court adverted to the intentions of the Framers.137 It brought in simple
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8.
127. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8–17.
128. Id. at 12–17.
129. See id. at 8–9, 11, 14, 16.
130. Id. at 13.
131. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 13 (J. Plamenatz ed., Meridian Books 1963)
(1651); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. II, §§ 4–8 (C. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1980) (1690). On the influence of Locke in American liberalism,
see HARTZ, supra note 2.
132. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554–55.
133. Id. at 557–58.
134. Id. at 560–61.
135. Id. at 561 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942)).
136. Id. at 562.
137. See id. at 563–64.
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“logic[],” and reconstructed what it considered to be the “basic aim of
legislative apportionment” to flesh out a constitutionally grounded
conception of democratic representation.138 In short, the Court’s methods
and approach, in the cases that essentially founded the field of constitutional
election law, were deeply pluralistic and fundamentally liberal.139
B. Deconsolidation into Incoherence
If the U.S. Constitution contains a potentially rich body of resources that
might guide courts in the constitutional management of democratic practices,
how has the Supreme Court actually proceeded? As this section shows, the
Court has slowly narrowed the provisions it considers relevant down to
two—twelve words out of nearly two thousand140—as its virtually exclusive,
all-purpose vehicles for adjudicating constitutional claims involving
democratic practice. The following section describes in some detail the
Court’s present constitutional jurisprudence of democratic practice.
1. The Move to Rights: Three Regimes
The Court’s jurisprudence of democracy consists of three major rights
regimes that the Court presently uses to adjudicate questions of democratic
practice: (1) a jurisprudence founded on the Equal Protection Clause and the
Fifteenth Amendment to handle claims of racial discrimination; (2) a
right-to-vote jurisprudence grounded in the Equal Protection Clause to
handle certain claims of infringement or dilution of the right to vote; and (3)
a comparatively newer, rapidly expanding, and increasingly comprehensive
First Amendment jurisprudence of speech and association to handle most
claims involving infringement of the right to vote as well as virtually all other
claims relating to democratic process and procedure.
a. Regime 1: Racial Discrimination
Not surprisingly, the Court’s earliest interventions in the field of
democratic practice were precipitated by incidents from the nation’s long,
ugly history of racial discrimination in politics. It was therefore inevitable
that some of the earliest cases to reach the Court in the field of democratic
process would involve egregious instances of naked, Jim Crow exclusion.
Some cases, for example, raised constitutional challenges to state laws
barring Black people from voting through means such as grandfather

138. Id. at 565.
139. These methods are characteristic of the way constitutional courts around the world
handle constitutional issues of democratic practice. See, e.g., ISSACHAROFF, supra note 108, at
194–96 (describing structural jurisprudence of several foreign constitutional courts).
140. The words are: “[E]qual protection of the laws” and “no law abridging the freedom
of speech.” U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV.
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clauses141 or prohibitions on Black participation in party primaries.142 Not
surprisingly, the Court turned in such cases to the Constitution’s two direct
prohibitions of racial discrimination—the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits racial discrimination generally, and
the Fifteenth Amendment, which narrowly targets racial discrimination in
voting. Because these amendments offer specialized tools for a highly
specific but recurring problem that cuts across every aspect of politics, the
Court’s reliance on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was not
merely reasonable, but obvious. As the Court observed in Smith v.
Allwright,143 “[i]t may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in . . .
a primary [or] general election is a right secured by the Constitution [which]
may not be abridged on account of race.”144
In later years, the Court continued consistently to rely on the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments to adjudicate claims that laws regulating
democratic practices and processes discriminated on the basis of race. In the
seminal, mid-twentieth-century case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot,145 for
example, the Court turned to the Fifteenth Amendment to invalidate an
Alabama law that redrew the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee in a way
that left every white resident inside the city and virtually every Black resident
outside it.146 In White v. Regester147 and Mobile v. Bolden,148 the Court
turned to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to adjudicate claims that
the use of at-large elections discriminated against Black or Latinx people. In
a more recent series of cases beginning with Shaw v. Reno,149 the Court
repeatedly invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to analyze claims that
redistricting authorities had relied excessively on the race of voters when
assigning them to election districts.
Not all constitutional problems with the regulation of politics, however,
arise from racial discrimination; in recent years, such claims have formed a
distinct minority of election-related litigation. Thus, the pertinent challenge
from the point of view of contemporary constitutional law is increasingly
how to handle claims involving democratic practices and processes that do
not turn on issues of race.150 For those purposes, the Court has developed
two additional regimes of rights enforcement.
141. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 277 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 347–
48 (1915).
142. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664–65
(1944); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
143. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
144. Id. at 661–62.
145. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
146. Id. at 346–47.
147. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
148. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
149. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Shaw was followed by numerous similar cases including Easley
v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Lawyer v. Dep’t
of Just., 521 U.S. 567 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899
(1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
150. See, e.g., Case Tracker, ELECTION L. AT OH. ST. UNIV., https://electioncases.osu.edu/
case-tracker/?sortby=filing_date_desc&keywords=&status=all&state=all&topic=25
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b. Regime 2: The Equal Protection-Based Right to Vote
In cases falling outside the realm of racial discrimination, the Court’s
approach for several decades consisted simply of extending the reach of the
Equal Protection Clause to cover new classes of problems as they arose.
Many of the earliest cases in this category involved state laws establishing
qualifications for voting—literacy, payment of a poll tax, residency, and so
forth—that had the effect of excluding the unqualified entirely from the
franchise.151 Litigants accordingly challenged such laws on the ground that
they interfered with a constitutionally grounded right to vote. The Court
agreed but, curiously, located the right to vote not in the provisions of the
Constitution that speak explicitly of voting—provisions, for example, in
Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment establishing an elected House of
Representatives152 and Senate,153 respectively—but in the Equal Protection
Clause, an awkward location that seems far from self-evidently the logical
place for a right to vote.
The Court’s difficulty in this enterprise, however, was self-created. In its
1874 decision in Minor v. Happersett,154 a pre-Nineteenth Amendment155
case in which a female plaintiff challenged a state law restricting the
franchise to males, the Court held that “the Constitution . . . does not confer
the right of suffrage upon any one”156—that there is, in other words, no
federally guaranteed constitutional right to vote.157 To permit it to evaluate
the constitutionality of franchise restrictions without overruling this
long-standing precedent, the Court turned to the Equal Protection Clause,
reasoning that even though the Constitution does not require states to allow
voting at all, or by anyone in particular, a state that does choose to create
elections by extending the franchise must do so in a way that comports with
the requirements of equal protection.158 The Court ultimately deployed this
[https://perma.cc/F5WA-LQ9R] (Dec. 31, 2020) (listing major litigation associated with the
2020 elections).
151. Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (literacy test);
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89 (1965) (residency).
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
153. Id. amend. XVII, § 1.
154. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
155. The Nineteenth Amendment prohibits discrimination in voting “on account of sex.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
156. 88 U.S. at 178.
157. The Court’s conclusion was a consequence of Article I, Section 4 and Article II,
Section 1, which allocate the authority to establish qualifications to vote in federal elections
to the states. For further explanation, see James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the
Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145
U. PA. L. REV. 893, 961–62 (1997).
158. The Court expressed this most clearly in Harris v. McRae:
Although the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right to vote in
state elections . . . if a State adopts an electoral system, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon a qualified voter a substantive right to
participate in the electoral process equally with other qualified voters.
448 U.S. 297, 322 n.25 (1980).
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equal protection–based right to vote in a series of cases adjudicating the
constitutionality of exclusions from the franchise based on literacy,159
residency,160 payment of a poll tax,161 status as a property taxpayer,162 and
length of residency in the jurisdiction.163
The pattern pioneered in these voter exclusion cases was soon extended to
other kinds of claims. In one line of cases, the Court turned to the Equal
Protection Clause and its embedded right to vote in cases involving
allegations of vote “dilution” rather than exclusion. Thus, in Reynolds v.
Sims, the Court invoked the right to vote—a right it characterized as
“individual and personal in nature”164—to invalidate malapportionment of
state legislative districts on the ground that the right of voters in
overpopulated districts was improperly diluted. It has since applied the
one-person, one-vote doctrine identified in Reynolds in many subsequent
cases.165 In another line of cases, since repudiated, the Court extended its
equal protection–based voting rights analysis to the adjudication of claims
challenging the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering.166 In yet
another line of cases, the Court applied the same right to vote in cases
involving limitations on candidacy, including restrictions on the ability of
candidates to get their names listed on the election ballot,167 age and property
qualifications for holding office,168 and resign-to-run legislation that requires
certain incumbents to resign their present office before running for
another.169 Finally and most recently, the Court has applied the equal
protection–based right to vote in cases involving election administration,
most notably in Bush v. Gore,170 where it held that the right to vote is violated
when some voters are subjected arbitrarily to substandard procedures for
recounting ballots in a contested election.171
159. Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1959).
160. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 75 (1978); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 96–97 (1965).
161. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
162. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632–33 (1969).
163. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 357–60 (1972).
164. 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964).
165. Some cases have dealt with the range of permissible population variance. Brown v.
Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Mahan v. Howell,
410 U.S. 315 (1973). Other cases extended the Reynolds equal protection analysis to various
species of special districts. Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Cipriano v. City
of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
166. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305–06
(2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986). These cases were repudiated in Rucho,
which held partisan gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139
S. Ct. 2514 (2019).
167. Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 795 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709,
718–19 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
149 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34–35 (1968).
168. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1991) (upholding law requiring
state judges to retire at age 70); Quinn v. Milsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109 (1989) (invalidating
property qualification to serve on local government reorganization commission).
169. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 972–73 (1982).
170. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
171. Id. at 134–35.
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In short, beginning roughly with its 1959 decision in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections,172 which upheld the use of literacy
tests, and for several decades thereafter, the Court deployed the right to vote,
a right it found embedded implicitly in the Equal Protection Clause, as its
primary workhorse in democracy-related cases that did not involve charges
of racial discrimination.
The reign of equal protection ended abruptly, however, and it is possible
to identify the date with some precision: April 19, 1983. That is the date on
which the Court handed down Anderson v. Celebrezze,173 a case in which the
Court refounded the right to vote in the First Amendment freedoms of speech
and association,174 a change that has had enormous—and enormously
damaging—consequences for how the Court approaches issues of democratic
process.
c. Regime 3: The Catch-All First Amendment
The newest—and conceptually the narrowest—branch of democratic
jurisprudence arises under the First Amendment. The Court’s interest in the
First Amendment as a tool to regulate electoral politics began routinely
enough. In a series of cases decided in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court
confronted a variety of laws imposing direct and overt regulatory constraints
on the content of political speech. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,175 for
example, the Court invalidated a state libel law that imposed liability on
private statements criticizing the performance of public officials so as to
protect their reputations from critical public comment.176 The Court
invalidated the law as applied to public officials on the ground that the First
Amendment forbids state punishment of the “good-faith critic of
government.”177 In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,178 the Court extended the
reach of the New York Times rule to protect criticism of candidates for
elective office, overturning a defamation award in favor of a candidate for
U.S. Senate whose character had been impugned by allegations of long-ago
criminal conduct.179
In Mills v. Alabama,180 the Court struck down a state law prohibiting all
“electioneering”—advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates
or ballot propositions—on Election Day.181 In Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC,182 the Court sustained against a First Amendment challenge a
Federal Communications Commission rule requiring broadcast licensees to
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

360 U.S. 45 (1959).
460 U.S. 780 (1983).
Id. at 806.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See id. at 292.
Id.
401 U.S. 265 (1971).
See id. at 277.
384 U.S. 214 (1966).
See id. at 216, 220.
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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provide free equal time to representatives of viewpoints contrary to those
presented by the broadcaster.183 In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,184 the Court invalidated a similar right-of-reply law as applied to
political attacks appearing in newspapers.185 All of these cases required the
Court to adjudicate the constitutionality of measures that imposed direct
regulatory restraints on what individuals were permitted to say in the course
of routine political campaigning. There is thus nothing in the slightest
surprising or untoward in the Court’s resort to the First Amendment to
resolve them; it is obviously an appropriate tool for the job.
Things began to change, however, in 1976 when the Court handed down
its seminal ruling in Buckley v. Valeo.186 There, the law under review did
not regulate political speech but rather the giving and spending of money
used to pay for political speech.187 In the Federal Election Campaign Act188
(FECA), enacted in 1971 and significantly amended in 1974, Congress set
ceilings on both monetary contributions to candidates for federal office and
independent expenditures in support of such candidates.189 In a fateful
decision, the Court chose to treat these restrictions as abridgments under the
First Amendment of the individual freedoms of political speech and political
association.190 Limitations on expenditures made to pay for political speech,
the Court held, could not be justified by any sufficiently compelling
government interest.191 In contrast, the Court ruled, caps on direct financial
contributions to candidates could be sustained, notwithstanding their
impingement on protected speech and associational interests, in virtue of the
government interest in preventing corruption.192
From here, the First Amendment juggernaut began to gather steam. In its
1983 decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Court took the significant step
of essentially firing the Equal Protection Clause as its main constitutional
vehicle in cases alleging infringement of the right to vote.193 In its place, the
Court substituted the First Amendment. Anderson was a ballot access case;
the plaintiff, an independent candidate in the 1980 presidential race,
challenged Ohio’s early filing deadline for independent candidates seeking
to be listed on the ballot.194 In a long line of prior cases, the Court had
adjudicated the constitutionality of state laws regulating access to the official
ballot under the Regime 2 Equal Protection Clause analysis discussed

183. See id. at 387–88.
184. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
185. Id. at 258.
186. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
187. See id. at 15.
188. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 47,
and 52 U.S.C.).
189. Buckley, 418 U.S. at 1–3, 17.
190. Id. at 17.
191. Id. at 51.
192. Id. at 35.
193. See 460 U.S. 780, 792–96 (1983).
194. Id. at 782–83.
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above.195 In Anderson, however, the Court announced that it would
thenceforth analyze ballot access restrictions under the First Amendment
right of freedom of association, a second-order right derived by implication
from the freedom of speech.196 The Court’s only explanation was buried in
a three-sentence footnote:
In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and do not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause
analysis. We rely, however, on the analysis in a number of our prior
election cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. These cases, applying the “fundamental rights” strand of
equal protection analysis, have identified the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights implicated by restrictions on the eligibility of voters and
candidates, and have considered the degree to which the State’s restrictions
further legitimate state interests.197

Although a restriction on having one’s name printed on an election ballot
is far from self-evidently a problem that cries out for treatment as a restriction
on political speech or association, the Court nevertheless went on in
Anderson to invalidate the restriction at issue on the ground that preventing
qualified candidates from obtaining a place on the ballot burdened
constitutionally protected association between candidates and their
supporters.198
If Anderson had applied only to ballot access cases, its impact might have
been slight. In fact, Anderson worked a much more significant and
far-reaching doctrinal change: it refounded the right to vote, in virtually all
of its applications, from principles of equal treatment to principles of free
speech and association. The magnitude of the change became clear only a
full decade later when the Court decided Burdick v. Takushi,199 a case raising
a constitutional challenge to a state law prohibiting write-in voting.200
Despite its rejection of the plaintiff’s free speech argument—that an election
ballot should be understood as “a general forum for political
expression”201—the Court nevertheless proceeded under the First
Amendment, but on a wholly different theory.
The Court began by addressing itself not to ballot access laws in particular,
but to “election laws” in general, a category of laws that, the Court observed,
“will invariably impose some burden on individual voters.”202 The Court
went on to articulate a well-known and now dominant test requiring courts
195. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 717–19 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149
(1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–35 (1968).
196. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806.
197. Id. at 786 n.7. Note that the Fourteenth Amendment is invoked here solely by way of
application of the incorporation doctrine through the Due Process Clause; it is not a reference
to the Equal Protection Clause.
198. Id. at 792–95, 806.
199. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
200. Id. at 430.
201. Id. at 445 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing and agreeing with this aspect of the
majority opinion).
202. Id. at 433 (majority opinion).
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“considering a challenge to a state election law” to weigh the burden on a
plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the government’s
justifications and to apply either strict scrutiny or rational basis review
depending on the outcome of that balancing.203 The result of the Court’s
analysis in Anderson and Burdick is that all claims alleging infringement of
a constitutionally grounded right to vote have been shifted presumptively
from the Equal Protection Clause to the First Amendment and that the
constitutionally relevant interests of plaintiffs are now redefined from
interests in equal treatment to interests in speaking freely and associating. As
the Court said plainly in a 2010 case, Burdick “acknowledged the existence
of a First Amendment interest in voting,”204 an interest that prior to 1983 had
never been acknowledged.
The reach of the Burdick reformulation is readily demonstrated by the
great variety of problems to which it has since been applied. The Supreme
Court itself has applied Burdick’s First Amendment analysis to adjudicate
the validity of laws regulating eligibility to vote in party primary elections,205
the presentation of photo identification at the polls,206 and disclosure of the
identity of initiative petition signers.207 Lower courts have dutifully applied
Burdick to an even wider variety of problems regarding the availability and
conditions of various voting procedures, including procedures for absentee
voting,208 special elections,209 recall elections,210 and reruns of invalidated
general elections;211 the qualifications of election officials, including petition
circulators,212 registrars,213 and election inspectors;214 the technicalities of
electoral management, including party nomination procedures,215 filing
fees,216 the casting and counting of provisional ballots,217 early voting,218
procedures for counting and verifying referendum petitions,219 official

203. See id. at 434.
204. John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 224 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
205. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 452–53 (2008);
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 602 (2005); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567,
572 (2000); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358–59 (1997).
Regulation of party primaries was governed by a First Amendment associational rights
analysis even before the decision in Burdick. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S.
208 (1986).
206. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198–204 (2008).
207. See, e.g., John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S. at 186.
208. Price v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 540 F.3d 101, 107–12 (2d Cir. 2008).
209. Monserrate v. N.Y. State Senate, 599 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2010).
210. Brassell v. Baker, 805 F. Supp. 925, 927 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
211. Ayers-Schaffner v. DiStefano, 37 F.3d 726, 729–30 (1st Cir. 1994).
212. Maslow v. Bd. of Elections, 658 F.3d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 2011); Nader v. Brewer, 531
F.3d 1028, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2008).
213. Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2013) (alternative
analysis).
214. Werme v. Merrill, 84 F.3d 479, 483–84 (1st Cir. 1996).
215. Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Blackwell, 462 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 2006).
216. Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 643–46 (3d Cir. 2003).
217. Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 592–93 (6th Cir. 2012).
218. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 429–30 (6th Cir. 2012).
219. Lemons v. Bradbury, 538 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008).
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practices of reporting vote totals,220 voter registration and party enrollment
practices,221 vote-counting practices in recall elections,222 the content of
nominating petitions,223 and designation of party labels on ballots;224 and
even the imposition of term limits on candidates for elected office.225
But the Burdick analysis is not the only vehicle the Court uses to subject
democratic procedures to First Amendment review. The Court continues, for
example, to apply First Amendment speech analysis to direct restrictions on
political speech.226 It applies First Amendment speech and associational
analyses to restrictions on the giving and spending of campaign money.227 It
invokes the First Amendment right of association to examine laws regulating
the activities of political parties.228 It has relied on the First Amendment to
adjudicate questions arising from laws requiring disclosure of information
about those who speak229 or give money in the course of political
campaigns.230 And it has relied on the First Amendment to adjudicate the
constitutionality of laws regulating the activities of political actors such as
initiative circulators.231 And although before Rucho the Court had
consistently applied the Equal Protection Clause in cases raising claims of
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering,232 a total of six different justices
in various cases asserted that such cases would be more tractable if handled
under the First Amendment.233 Before the Court’s ruling in Rucho rendered
them irrelevant, lower courts had already begun to turn to the First
Amendment to resolve partisan gerrymandering claims.234
To be sure, the Court, for obvious and appropriate reasons, still adjudicates
cases involving claims of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection
220. Libertarian Party v. D.C. Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 682 F.3d 72, 73–74 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
221. Green Party of N.Y. State v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 389 F.3d 411, 419 (2d Cir.
2004).
222. Partnoy v. Shelley, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1073 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
223. Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 1994).
224. Libertarian Party of N.H. v. Gardner, 638 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2011).
225. Citizens for Legis. Choice v. Miller, 144 F.3d 916, 920–21 (6th Cir. 1998); Bates v.
Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 846–47 (9th Cir. 1997).
226. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018); Burson v. Freeman, 504
U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
227. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 329 (2010).
228. Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989).
229. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
230. John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14
(1976).
231. Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 192 (1999).
232. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423 (2006); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118 (1986).
233. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314–15 (Kennedy, J. concurring); see also Rucho v. Common
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2514 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938 (2018) (Kagan, J.,
concurring) (joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor).
234. League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Benson, 373 F.Supp.3d 867, 912 (E.D. Mich.
2019); Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder, 373 F.Supp.3d 978, 1073–74 (S.D. Ohio
2019).
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Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment (Regime 1),235 both of which provide
specialized tools designed expressly for such controversies. It also continues
to use the equal protection–based right to vote (Regime 2) in certain narrow
classes of vote dilution cases, such as cases involving apportionment,
redistricting, and the one-person, one-vote doctrine. But aside from these
exceptions, it is fair to say that the Court now finds the First Amendment
(Regime 3) so versatile and appealing a provision that it approaches its
democracy cases as though the First Amendment is virtually the only
provision in the entire Constitution relevant to the system of representative
democracy it institutionalizes. The First Amendment has become for the
Court essentially a one-provision constitution, complete in itself, capable of
solving nearly every problem of democracy for which judicial review may
be had.
2. The Scholarly Critique
As this movement in the Court’s jurisprudence picked up steam, scholars
began to criticize it. Here is where the critique of “incoherence” began to
have some bite, although it was made in several different ways. Some
scholars, for example, charged the Court with incoherence on an ad hoc basis
as a way of arguing that the Court’s election law jurisprudence had begun to
produce results that in particular cases or domains were so unpredictable or
unexpected as to seem essentially random.236 Others, however, leveled the
charge of incoherence in a broader and more systematic way by arguing that
the incoherence of the jurisprudence was a direct consequence of the Court’s
methodological choice to decide election law issues almost entirely using the
vehicle of individual rights.237 The origins of this “structuralist” critique238
are often traced to an influential 1998 article by Professors Sam Issacharoff
and Rick Pildes in which they argued that a jurisprudence based in rights was
“too narrow to capture the range of considerations” inherent in the
adjudication of issues relating to democratic practice.239 The Court’s
insistence on adjudicating such questions solely through resort to individual
rights, they claimed, led to a series of “awkward attempts to fold difficult
235. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,
237 (2001); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 638
(1993).
236. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against
Government Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351, 354 (2017) (Vieth is a “puzzling aberration
from the general norm against government nonpartisanship.”); Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting Is
Association, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 784 (2016) (“The major problem with the
Anderson-Burdick standard . . . is that it’s unclear exactly what the inquiry into the ‘character’
of the burden should entail.”).
237. See supra note 62.
238. See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND.
L.J. 1289, 1291 (2011); David Schleicher, Overview: Mapping Election Law’s Interior, in
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 75, 78 (Guy-Uriel Charles, Heather K. Gerken, and Michael S. Kang,
eds., 2011).
239. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 62, at 646.
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questions of democratic politics and judicial review into the conventional
regime of rights-based constitutional and statutory law.”240 That is to say,
the Court’s approach to a set of critically important constitutional problems
was impeded by its “failure to use the proper normative tools.”241 As a result,
“the Court’s electoral jurisprudence lacks any underlying vision of
democratic politics that is normatively robust or realistically sophisticated
about actual political practices.”242 In the absence of such an underlying
theory or vision of appropriate democratic practice, solidly grounded in
constitutional principles, incoherence is said to be the predictable outcome.
In what ways did the Court’s jurisprudence of democratic practice seem
incoherent? For example, as indicated in Part I, the Court took inconsistent
approaches to regulation of political contributions and expenditures,
essentially rewriting the Federal Election Campaign Act, a coherent piece of
legislation as enacted, into self-contradiction.243 Or, the Court, seemingly
inexplicably, rejected the innovation of the blanket primary.244 It startlingly
overturned long-standing, widely valued limitations on how candidates may
campaign for elective judgeships,245 and any form whatsoever of limitation
on campaign spending, no matter how benignly motivated.246
A persistent signal of the growing incoherence of the Court’s fully
rights-based jurisprudence is that seemingly easy cases suddenly posed great
jurisprudential difficulty. A particularly vivid example of this phenomenon,
from among many candidates, is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lindsay v.
Bowen.247 Article II of the U.S. Constitution requires the president of the
United States to be at least 35 years of age.248 In Lindsay, a 27-year-old who
wished to run for president argued that her exclusion from the California
presidential ballot on the ground of age ineligibility violated her First
Amendment rights and those of her party and its supporters. On any
reasonable view of the matter, this case is resolved completely and decisively
by the plain language of a foundational structural provision of the
Constitution: Article II. It is hard to understand why any court would even
bother to conduct an analysis of such a claim or write a full opinion.
Nevertheless, applying what it viewed, not illogically, as binding Supreme
Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit turned immediately to the First
Amendment claim to analyze the degree to which the constitutional age
requirement “burden[s] . . . Lindsay’s speech and association rights.”249 To

240. Id. at 645.
241. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering the Law of Democracy: Of Political Questions,
Prudence, and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1899, 1946 (2006).
242. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 62, at 646.
243. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 39, at 1710–11.
244. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 577 (2000).
245. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
246. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 754–55 (2011);
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738–44 (2008).
247. 750 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014).
248. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
249. Lindsay, 750 F.3d at 1063.
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its credit, I suppose, the court found the burden “minimal”250 and thus upheld
the exclusion, although a better result surely would have been to find the
“burden” on the plaintiff’s “rights” exactly zero on the ground that a
structural provision of the Constitution provides a definitive and fully
binding answer to the question posed.
Another easy case that became unnecessarily difficult when handled under
a narrow regime of First Amendment rights is Burson v. Freeman,251 in
which the Supreme Court upheld a state law prohibiting electioneering within
one hundred feet of polling places.252 It is hard to imagine any measure more
innocuous than one that requires active campaigning for office to be left
outside the polling place itself. Such laws provide voters, at an appropriate
moment immediately before casting their ballots, with a brief period of
mental repose in which they can compose their thoughts, concentrate on the
task at hand, and decide how to discharge the weighty civic duty of voting.253
At the same time, such laws leave political actors free to campaign in every
other place, at every other time, so any loss of opportunity to campaign
within, or in the immediate vicinity of, the polling place on Election Day is
utterly trivial. Indeed, common sense suggests strongly that the only reason
candidates or their supporters would even seek the opportunity to appeal to
voters as they enter the polling place or while they vote is not to engage them
in a meaningful exchange on the merits of a candidacy but transparently to
exploit the possibility that some voters might be influenced to vote for the
candidate whose name they have most recently seen or heard,254 an interest
entitled to precisely zero weight in any system that aspires to thoughtful
democratic self-rule. Other jurisdictions that no one would consider unfree
place considerably greater restrictions on campaigning—New Zealand, for
example, prohibits all campaigning on election day, and Spain designates the
day before an election an official “day of reflection” on which all
campaigning is banned255—so the deprivation worked by American
electioneering laws again is trivial by comparison.
Nevertheless, the Court found this a difficult case. Because the Court was
committed to adjudicating the case under the First Amendment, the facts
provided immediate trouble. Electioneering laws not only prohibit speech,
but do so in a content-based manner—only campaign speech is prohibited—
so the Court found itself compelled by its First Amendment precedents to
apply strict scrutiny.256 This framework immediately and inappropriately put
a strong thumb on the scale in favor of invalidation,257 and the majority had
250. Id.
251. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
252. See id. at 211.
253. See generally James A. Gardner, Neutralizing the Incompetent Voter: A Comment on
Cook v. Gralike, 1 ELECTION L.J. 49 (2002).
254. See id. at 55.
255. GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 28, at 660.
256. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 198.
257. As Justice Holmes once observed, “All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to
their logical extreme.” Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
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to work far harder than necessary to find a way to uphold the law. In the end,
three justices voted to strike down the law on the ground that it engaged in
“censorship of election-day campaigning,”258 which is exactly what the law
does—a fact that, under any other regime of constitutional analysis, would
count as a mark in its favor.
C. Reconsolidation: The Path to Illiberalism
Like any weed, authoritarianism thrives in disorderly conditions.259
Consequently, one of the first tasks of populist opponents of an established
liberal democratic order is to deconsolidate it, sowing the kind of
confusion—and associated anxiety—that enhances the appeal of the
simplistic, seemingly orderly, but typically illiberal, prescriptions offered by
populism.260 Once an unpleasant sense of chaos and disorder has been
established, illiberal actors can much more easily introduce illiberal
measures.261
This is roughly the path pursued by the Supreme Court in its constitutional
jurisprudence of democratic practice. If, as I have argued, the Court
gradually deconsolidated its constitutional jurisprudence of democratic
practice into incoherence, its more recent decisions suggest that the Court has
entered a new phase: reconsolidation of a now-wrecked, liberal democratic
jurisprudence into an overtly illiberal one. The Court’s strategy in this phase
appears to have two prongs: First, it has drastically narrowed the class of
democratic issues that it construes the Constitution to address, exiling to
constitutional oblivion a wide variety of potential claims relevant to the
practice of democracy, and remanding to politics abuses that politics is
unlikely to correct because it is politics that has generated them. Second,
where the Court does construe constitutional rights to address claims
regarding democratic practice, it has been highly selective concerning the
vigor with which it construes the Constitution to protect the right in question.
In some cases, the Court has pushed its increasingly narrow conception of
constitutionally protected principles with extraordinary force. In other cases,
however, it has taken a remarkably casual approach, finding unobjectionable
invasions even of the narrow individual rights it still acknowledges to enjoy
constitutional protection. On the whole, these parallel approaches have

258. Burson, 504 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259. See generally KAGAN, supra note 65.
260. Id. at 112, 114 (“To achieve greatness on the world stage, Russia must bring the world
back to a past when neither the Russians nor anyone else enjoyed security”; consequently,
“Putin has sought to disrupt, divide, and degrade the liberal world order”); see also KAREN
STENNER, THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC 71–72 (2005) (individual predispositions to
authoritarianism can be triggered by a sense of insecurity, a sense often derived from the
routine conditions of liberal democratic politics, i.e., disagreement and partisan bickering);
Rachel Marie Blum & Christopher Sebastian Parker, Trump-ing Foreign Affairs: Status
Threat and Foreign Policy Preferences on the Right, 17 PERSPS. ON POL. 737, 739 (2019) (a
sense of threat to personal status triggers preferences for illiberal policies).
261. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 4, at 95, 192–93 (describing the role of crises in
enabling authoritarian leaders).
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produced outcomes that can only be characterized as illiberal and
anti-democratic.
1. Jurisprudential Exile: Narrowing the Field of Relevant Considerations
One of the Court’s principal strategies has been to exclude from judicial
consideration—and thus from the purview of the Constitution—an
ever-greater variety of claims and considerations. Here, I mention four: (1)
an extremely broad and powerful “gag rule” that drastically narrows the
vocabulary, and thus the stock of concepts, that litigants may invoke; (2) an
informal cap on the number and kinds of rights that the Constitution will be
construed to recognize; (3) expansion of the political question doctrine to
exclude judicial consideration of challenges to practices that are agreed to be
obnoxious to democratic self-rule; and (4) a conception of litigant standing
so narrow as to preclude judicial consideration of a growing number of
increasingly urgent claims about democratic practice.
a. The Gag Rule
By far the most significant effect of the Court’s turn to individual rights
has been the severe narrowing of constitutional discourse that it has
produced. It is true, of course, that the Equal Protection Clause and the First
Amendment offer litigants a vocabulary and stock of concepts in which to
express their claims. Just as important, however, is the vocabulary litigants
are now denied. In the absence of availability of any considerations of
democratic structure or constitutional telos, litigants challenging manifestly
undemocratic practices may not raise an issue of constitutional dimension by
arguing, for example, that a law is “undemocratic.” They may not argue that
a regulatory measure “deprives me of representation,” or that it “impairs the
democratic accountability of government,” or that it undermines “popular
sovereignty,” or that it makes the government “insufficiently responsive” to
the popular will, or that it gives “disproportionate political influence” to a
group or to individuals. All of these are prominent and indeed constitutive
principles of democracy, however it is conceived,262 yet the Court’s
jurisprudence of individual rights completely excludes these concepts from
judicial consideration; they play literally no role whatsoever in its analysis or
decision-making. The Court’s conceptual vocabulary thus excludes from the
constitutional analysis the very terms and concepts to which people routinely
turn when talking about democracy, and which indeed, on any reasonable
view of the matter, are inseparable from a meaningful understanding of what
democracy is and how it operates.263 Indeed, in cases that do not involve
262. The locus classicus is surely LOCKE, supra note 131, ch. II, §§ 4–8, but see also
contemporary theorists such as ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 106–18, 135–
52 (1989). As Steven Shiffrin has observed, “the First Amendment is interpreted in ways that
are at odds with any sensible understanding of democracy.” STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S
WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 95 (2016).
263. See generally DENNIS THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL
PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002). Relatedly, as Charles Black wrote half a century ago,
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racial discrimination, about all that litigants are now entitled to assert is that
some rule or practice impairs their speech or association—by no means a
natural or even sensible way to describe many highly significant democratic
insults.
Moreover, by choosing to rely almost exclusively in democracy cases on
the First Amendment, the Court—several of whose members believe they are
compelled to interpret the Constitution by resort to the intentions of the
Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution—has cut itself off from an
enormously rich body of founding-era political opinion and evidence. The
First Amendment is notorious not only for the paucity of its legislative
history but also for the acknowledged irrelevance to contemporary problems
of such legislative history as exists.264 Thus, the present jurisprudence
disables litigants not only from arguing on the merits that some particular
government action is anti-democratic but also that the Framers would so have
conceived it.
b. The Rights That Don’t Exist
If a court is going to found a constitutional jurisprudence of democracy
exclusively on individual rights, it is surely necessary that the available rights
be sufficient in scope and variety to reach the wide variety of abuses of
democratic practice that corrupt, self-interested, or single-minded partisan
officials might deploy. Yet a remarkable feature of the rights approach is
that the number and scope of constitutionally protected democratic rights
recognized by the Court is unusually narrow and not at all adequate to the
substantial managerial task.
The problems begin with the single most important right in a democratic
republic: the right to vote itself. Although the Court has recognized such a
right, it has not construed it robustly—that is, the Court has not actually found
the right to vote to be affirmatively granted by any provision of the
Constitution. Instead, as related above, the Court has found it to exist only
indirectly, in two ways. First, the Equal Protection Clause indirectly contains
a watered-down, relativistic right to vote.265 This right does not acknowledge
in any particular class of individuals an actual, affirmative right to cast a
ballot in any particular election; instead, it requires only that such
opportunities to vote as governments might in their beneficence choose to
provide be distributed in a way that is free of prohibited discrimination.266
excluding considerations of structure from the interpretational resources on which we rely
often diverts our attention from more important, if implicit, principles; it “forces us to blur the
focus and talk evasively, while the structural method frees us to talk sense.” CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (1969).
264. In the words of Robert Bork, one of the founders of the modern originalism movement,
“[t]he framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not to have been
overly concerned with the subject.” Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971).
265. See Gardner, supra note 157, at 959–67.
266. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 n.25 (1980) (“Although the Constitution of
the United States does not confer the right to vote . . . if a State adopts an electoral system, the
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Second, the right exists indirectly under the First Amendment as something
that governments may not excessively burden,267 but which has no
constitutional force or presence independent of the speech and associational
interests with which it is indirectly associated. The First Amendment right
to vote is thus, in essence, a collection of electrons missing a nucleus.
Similarly, there is no right to run for office.268 In a democratic republic
committed to the election of representatives, there must be candidates. States
understand this well: state law heavily regulates the conditions under which
those interested in public service may stand for elective office.269 When
these laws preclude, or place large obstacles in the path of, the candidacy of
those who wish to run for elective office, we might expect a commitment to
an individual rights approach to produce a constitutionally grounded right to
run for office. Yet the Court has consistently refused to admit the existence
of such a right. Instead, the Court has adjudicated challenges to restrictions
on candidacy indirectly, by treating laws restricting candidacy as though they
were laws restricting the right to vote.270 Indeed, the Court’s approach
substitutes for one nonexistent right—the right to run for office—a different
right—the right to vote—which also lacks direct constitutional grounding.
Similarly, in many cases, the Court has been at pains to point out that the
Constitution does not contain a right to proportional representation.271 What
the Court neglects to mention is that the Constitution, as construed by the
Court, does not contain a right even to disproportional representation because
the Court has not construed the Constitution to confer a right to any kind of
representation at all.272 It is intrinsic to the idea of representative democracy
that a democratically elected government ought to be accountable and
responsive to the popular will,273 but there is no individual or group right to
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon a qualified voter a
substantive right to participate in the electoral process equally with other qualified voters.”).
267. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432–34 (1992).
268. See, e.g., NAACP v. Jones, 131 F.3d 1317, 1324 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Candidates do not
have a fundamental right to run for public office.”); see also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
142–43 (1972) (“[T]he Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental status to candidacy
as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.”). This puts the United States at odds with
international practice, which recognizes an individual right “to be elected at genuine periodic
elections.” G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 25(b) (Dec. 16, 1966).
269. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-100 (McKinney 2021); CAL. ELECT. CODE §§ 8000–
8150 (West 2021).
270. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (citing Bullock, 405 U.S.
at 143).
271. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019).
272. See Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 234 (1966) (holding that there is no constitutional
right to vote for governor).
273. This is true in versions of democratic theory ranging from minimalism, in which
accountability is basically the only criterion of whether a system counts as democratic, see
JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1950); to economic
theories, in which policy correspondence to popular preferences is the critical characteristic
of democracy, see ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); to
classically liberal theories, see LOCKE, supra note 131; to the most demanding contemporary
theories of deliberative democracy, see Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic
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accountability or responsiveness. In the same vein, there is no right to
register to vote; no right to organize an officially recognized political party;
no right of individuals or parties to get their names printed on the ballot; no
right to a majoritarian political process; no right to a convenient and
accessible polling place, nor any right to enter whatever polling place the
state may provide; nor any right to a secret ballot, nor to a secure one. In a
jurisprudence in which the Court insists that all constitutional management
of democratic practice occur through the adjudication of rights claims, the
absence of these rights renders the practice of meaningful democratic
self-rule startlingly precarious.
c. The Claims That Don’t Exist
If the Court has narrowed the range of judicially cognizable considerations
by capping the number of recognized democratic constitutional rights, it has
also done so lately by narrowing the kinds of claims that will be deemed
judicially cognizable. By far the most notable example of this is the Court’s
2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause.274 Americans are polarized on
many issues, but on the question of partisan gerrymandering they
overwhelmingly agree: according to a recent survey, 71 percent of
Americans “want the Supreme Court to place limits on lawmakers’ ability to
manipulate voting maps.”275 In a sharp reversal of four decades of
constitutional jurisprudence, the Court in Rucho held that constitutional
challenges to partisan gerrymandering by state legislatures raised questions
so unsuited for judicial review that they must be deemed fundamentally
political rather than judicial.276 As a result, the Court held judicial
consideration of partisan gerrymandering claims to lie outside the
jurisdiction of federal courts.277
d. No One Has Standing
Finally, even when the Court concedes that abuses of democratic norms
and practices raise cognizable constitutional claims, the Court increasingly
has narrowed the circumstances in which plaintiffs may pursue them by
aggressively deploying the Article III jurisdictional requirement of litigant
standing.278 The Court began to deploy Article III to choke off access to the
Constitution in democracy cases in United States v. Hays.279 There, it held
Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17, 17 (Alan Hamlin
& Philip Pettit eds., 1989).
274. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
275. Kylee Groft, The Results Are In: Most Americans Want Limits on Gerrymandering,
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Sept. 11, 2017), https://campaignlegal.org/update/results-are-mostamericans-want-limits-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/7QEZ-CEL2].
276. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499.
277. Id.
278. For an overview, now unfortunately somewhat out of date, see Saul Zipkin,
Democratic Standing, 26 J.L. & POL. 179 (2011).
279. 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
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that only people residing physically within a racially gerrymandered district
have standing to challenge it, notwithstanding the impact of racial
gerrymandering in one district on voters residing within other districts.280 In
another redistricting case, the Court held that voters lacked standing to
challenge a state legislature’s mid-decade redrawing of district lines for
partisan advantage.281 In another, the Court held that a chamber of a state
legislature lacked standing to defend its own districting plan against charges
of racial gerrymandering,282 and in another, the Court could not find a proper
plaintiff to raise a constitutional claim of partisan gerrymandering.283
But many of the standing cases have had nothing to do with redistricting.
Thus, for example, the sponsors of a state ballot initiative lacked standing to
defend its constitutionality even when state officials refused to do so.284 A
candidate for elective judicial office lacked standing to challenge a state law
requiring him to be a member of a political party.285 No one had standing to
challenge a policy decision by the Trump administration to exclude from the
decennial census count unlawful immigrants residing in the United States, a
practice very plausibly alleged to be blatantly unconstitutional.286
Now, it is certainly possible that some of these lawsuits are not the kind
on which federal courts should expend their limited resources, but this is by
no means true of all the cases that federal courts are now dismissing on
standing grounds.287 Moreover, a different way to deter unwanted litigation
over democratic procedures would be to develop and apply a robustly
democratic jurisprudence that makes clear that anti-democratic laws and
practices will not be tolerated under the U.S. Constitution.
2. Selective Vigor in Deploying Recognized Rights
In addition to narrowing drastically the range of claims about democratic
practice that it deems the Constitution to address and of which federal courts
may take cognizance, where the Court still acknowledges a role for the
Constitution, it has exercised great selectivity in determining the degree of
constitutional protection for interests acknowledged to be of constitutional
dimension. In some domains, the Court has pressed narrow rights
single-mindedly, and with extraordinary force, to provide highly robust
protection to an exceedingly narrow set of interests. In other domains, it has
taken a remarkably ho-hum approach, setting levels of constitutional
protection at surprisingly low levels.

280. See id. at 744–45.
281. See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007).
282. Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1949–51 (2019).
283. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018).
284. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 715 (2013).
285. See Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 503 (2020).
286. See Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530, 536–37 (2020) (per curiam).
287. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in
Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2287 (1998) (criticizing the result and reasoning
of Hays).
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By far the most extreme example of the Court pressing narrow rights with
great force—and likely the most consequential—is in the domain of
campaign finance. There, the Court has applied First Amendment rights of
speech and association (Regime 3) with great vigor, but in a single direction
and against a single target: it has one by one invalidated virtually every
conceivable limitation on the ability of political actors to spend money in
pursuit of their political objectives. As explained earlier, this line of cases
derives from Buckley v. Valeo, in which the Court invalidated regulatory
limits on campaign expenditures by individuals and candidates as violations
of their rights of speech and association.288 Within the last decade, however,
the Court has pursued this agenda with unusual energy. In 2010, in Citizens
United v. FEC, the Court invalidated a century-old prohibition on corporate
political spending from general treasury funds.289 In so holding, the Court
found the interests of corporations in speaking out on political subjects and
holding government officials accountable to be heavily burdened by such
restrictions, notwithstanding that corporations cannot vote, have no political
personality, are more than adequately represented in the political arena by
their officers and employees participating in an individual capacity, and had
long been permitted to raise money, and spend it without limit in the political
arena, through affiliated political action committees.290 In so doing, the
Court expressly overruled an earlier case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce,291 because a majority in that case had the effrontery to
acknowledge that “immense aggregations of wealth” may have “corrosive
and distorting effects” on democratic processes and outcomes.292
The following year, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett,293 the
Court invalidated a system of public financing for state elections in which
candidates facing rich, self-financed opponents were eligible to receive
additional public funds to level the playing field.294 Even though, after
Buckley, rich, self-financed candidates are free to spend their own money on
their own campaigns without limit,295 and the provision at issue was
triggered only when candidates competing for the same office were badly
mismatched in terms of resources, the Court construed this provision to

288. 424 U.S. 1, 17–23 (1976).
289. See 558 U.S. 310, 371–72 (2010).
290. This resulted from the interaction of the FECA and the Court’s ruling in FEC v.
National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480 (1985). Under
FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B), corporations, though not permitted to make political
expenditures directly out of general treasury funds, were permitted to do so by setting up a
captive political action committee (PAC) known as a “separate segregated fund” (SSF). After
the Court’s ruling in NCPAC, in which the Court invalidated a provision of FECA limiting
independent expenditures by PACs, SSFs were permitted to make unlimited independent
political expenditures. See 470 U.S. at 501.
291. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
292. Id. at 684.
293. 564 U.S. 721 (2011).
294. Id. at 753–55.
295. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976).

2021]

ILLIBERALIZATION OF AMERICAN ELECTION LAW

459

impose “an unprecedented” burden on the speech rights of rich candidates.296
The Court thus seemed to take the position that the rich have the right not
only to speak without limitation, but to speak without fear of effective
contradiction by the poor.
Three years later, in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court invalidated an overall
spending cap of more than $123,000 on contributions to multiple candidates
for federal office.297 Despite reaffirming the authority of governments to
limit contributions to individual candidates because of their potential to
corrupt, the Court found a prohibition on making the maximum contribution
to an unlimited number of candidates to be “not a ‘modest restraint’ at all.”298
Thus, the First Amendment right of rich contributors to support not only
candidates who compete to represent them directly, but who compete to
represent others with whom the donor shares no political community, nor
even any political relationship, cannot be abridged. If, in the 1960s, the Court
was able to determine that legislators do not “represent . . . trees or acres
[or] . . . farms or cities,”299 over the ensuing half-century it evidently figured
out what legislators do represent: dollars.
At the same time, where speech and money are not directly at stake, the
Court has frequently construed the constitutionally grounded right to vote to
offer little protection against government interference. In Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board,300 for example, the Court upheld an Indiana
law requiring presentation of photo identification as a condition for voting.301
Indiana justified the law, among the most restrictive in the nation, as
necessary to prevent voter impersonation at the polls, even though not a
single incident of such fraud had ever been recorded in the state’s entire
history.302 The law required eligible voters who lacked one of a limited
number of permitted forms of identification to obtain satisfactory ID from a
state motor vehicle office,303 even though such offices were widely scattered
in many parts of the state and suitable public transportation was either
nonexistent or extremely inconvenient.304 Obtaining suitable ID also in
many cases required a financial outlay that eligible but indigent voters might
not be able to afford.305 In balancing the interests on both sides, the Court
found the burden on voters insufficient to outweigh a state justification that
was at best speculative, and at worst entirely fraudulent.306
296. Ariz. Free Enter. Club, 564 U.S. at 736 (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739
(2008)).
297. See 572 U.S. 185, 194, 227 (2014).
298. Id. at 204 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38).
299. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
300. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
301. See id. at 194, 199–200, 204.
302. Id. at 194.
303. Id. at 185.
304. Id. at 212–15 (Souter, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 211–18.
306. LORRAINE MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 156–57 (2010); CAROL ANDERSON,
ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS DESTROYING OUR DEMOCRACY 50–71
(2018).
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Similarly, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Court invalidated section 4 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 on the ground that the risk of racial
discrimination in voting by states subject to the VRA no longer justified the
VRA’s strict preclearance provisions.307 Within hours of the ruling, covered
states proved the Court wrong by rolling out a wide variety of vote
suppression measures.308 States continued to use their newfound freedom
from federal oversight to enact measures harmful to the political participation
of Black voters, all the way through the most recent election.309
As noted above, during the period when the Court was handing down these
decisions, scholars interpreted what they were seeing as jurisprudential
incoherence, and understandably so.310 In retrospect, however, it is now
clear that the problem with these rulings is not that they are incoherent; it is
that they are illiberal. They deny the fundamental political equality of
citizens; they deny that the majority presumptively should rule; they
repudiate principles of fair and equal representation developed by the Court
in its earlier cases; they undermine the possibility of holding officials
meaningfully accountable for their actions; and although they acknowledge
rights associated with successful democracy, such as rights of free speech
and political association, they fail to acknowledge and protect the core
interests that these peripheral rights are meant to serve: democratic self-rule
by the American polity, in all its messy, pluralistic diversity.
CONCLUSION
In what is surely one of the greatest ironies of American constitutional law,
the U.S. Supreme Court has for a generation or more slowly illiberalized the
constitutional jurisprudence of democracy through the exceedingly
aggressive deployment of one of the signature devices of liberalism itself: a
constitutional right. Long ago, when I was a law student, one often heard it
said that law school “sharpens” students by “narrowing” them, a charge
meant to imply a warping of the soul. Much the same may be said of the
Court’s jurisprudence of democratic practice. By continually narrowing the
scope of considerations deemed relevant to the constitutionalization of
democracy, it has warped the soul of a republican constitution, transforming
it into exactly what it is not and was never meant to be: a deeply illiberal
document that empowers the powerful and subordinates the weak.

307. See 570 U.S. 529, 547, 557 (2013).
308. See generally THURGOOD MARSHALL INST. AT NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND,
INC., DEMOCRACY DIMINISHED: STATE AND LOCAL THREATS TO VOTING POST-SHELBY COUNTY,
ALABAMA V. HOLDER (2016).
309. For an overview of litigation over voter suppression measures through Election Day
2020, see Joshua A. Douglas, Undue Deference to States in the 2020 Election Litigation (Feb.
4, 2021) (unpublished draft), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3720065
[https://perma.cc/TCE5-KEMR].
310. See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Provisions of the U.S. Constitution Relating to Democratic Practice
1.
Art. I, § 2, cl. 1: The House of Representatives shall be composed
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,
and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
2.
Art. I, § 2, cl. 2: No Person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen
of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that
State in which he shall be chosen.
3.
Art. I, § 2, cl. 3: Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The
actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting
of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of
ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each
State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall
be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three,
Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one,
Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight,
Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South
Carolina five, and Georgia three.
4.
Art. I, § 2, cl. 4: When vacancies happen in the Representation from
any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill
such Vacancies.
5.
Art. I, § 4, cl. 1: The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
6.
Art. I, § 5, cl. 1: Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . .
7.
Art. I, § 9, cl. 8: No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States . . .
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8.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 1: [T]ogether with the Vice President, chosen for the
same Term, [the President shall] be elected, as follows . . .
9.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2: Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled
in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an
Elector.
10. Art. II, § 1, cl. 3: The electors shall meet in their respective States,
and vote by ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an
Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of
all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government
of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of
the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person
having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number
be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be
more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes,
then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of
them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five
highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President.
But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the
Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose
shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of the States, and a
Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after
the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes
of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or
more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the
Vice-President.
11. Art. II, § 1, cl. 4: The Congress may determine the Time of chusing
the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day
shall be the same throughout the United States.
12. Art. IV, § 4: The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government . . .
13. Amend. I: Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
14. Amend. XII: The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and
vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall
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not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the
person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all
persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President,
and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify,
and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States,
directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in
the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having the
greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number
be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person
have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of
Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in
choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a
member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives
shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President
shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional
disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of votes
as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority
of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority,
then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the
Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the
whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office
of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.
15. Amend. XIV:
1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
2: Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any
of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
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reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear
to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
5: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
16. Amend. XV:
1: The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
2: The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
17. Amend. XVII: The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years;
and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have
the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate,
the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term
of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.
18. Amend. XIX: The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
19. Amend. XXIII:
1: The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States
shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of
electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of
Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be
entitled if it were a state, but in no event more than the least populous state;
they shall be in addition to those appointed by the states, but they shall be
considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President,
to be electors appointed by a state; and they shall meet in the District and
perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.
2: The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
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20. Amend. XXIV:
1: The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other
election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any
poll tax or other tax.
2: The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
21. Amend. XXVI:
1: The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age
or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any
state on account of age.
2: The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.

